A well-respected philosophy blog asked its readers to recommend books for summer reading. Here is the list for the philosophy of science. The focus is a bit different than found in our philosophy of science course but it is an instructive list and worth a bit of exploration.
Confirmation and Falsification
Hempel, C. 1966. Philosophy of Natural Science, Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, especially Chapters 2-4 (pages 3-46).
Popper, K. R. 1963. Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge, New York: Basic Books Inc., Publishers, especially Chapters 1 and 10 (pages 33-59 and 215-250).
Duhem, P. 1914/1954. Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, Princeton: Princeton University Press, especially Chapter VI: “Physical Theory and Experiment” (pages 180-218).
Quine, W. V. 1951/1953. “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” in From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Goodman, N. 1955. Fact, Fiction, and Forecast, 4th edition, Chapter 4.
Kuhn and the Historical Turn
Kuhn, T. S. 1962/1996. Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 3rd edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, especially Chapters 9-10 (pages 92-135).
Lakatos, I. 1970. “Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes,” in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pages 91-196.
Kuhn, T. S. 1977. Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, especially Chapters 9-13 (pages 225-339).
Feyerabend, P. 1975/1988. Against Method, Revised edition. London: Verso, especially Chapters 1-5 (pages 14-54).
Shapere, D. 1966/1981. “Meaning and Scientific Change,” in I. Hacking, (ed.), Scientific Revolutions, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pages 28-59.
Realism and Anti-realism
Van Fraassen, B. C. 1980. Scientific Image, Oxford: Clarendon Press, especially Chapter 2 (pages 6-40).
The various papers in
D. Papineau’s (ed.), 1996. Philosophy of Science, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Laudan, L. 1981/1996. “A Confutation of Convergent Realism,” pages 107-138.
Fine, A. 1984/1996. “Natural Ontological Attitude,” pages 21-44.
Lipton, P. 1993/1996. “Is the Best Good Enough?,” pages 93-106.
Worrall, J. 1989/1996. “Structural Realism: The Best of Both Worlds?,” pages 93-106.
Hacking, I. 1983. Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Science, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, especially Chapter 16 (pages 262-275).